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The EU accession process brings a profound transformation not only to candidate countries’ 
institutions and policies, but also to the political opportunity structure in place, creating new 
possibilities for previously marginalised actors. Studying the differential empowerment of 
NGOs throughout the Croatian accession process, this paper makes two related claims: first, 
differential empowerment depends crucially on domestic actors’ awareness for and ability to 
use new opportunities to their advantage. Second, an overreliance on EU leverage poses 
important temporal and substantive limits on NGO empowerment and leads to a rapid decline 
of their relevance in the post-accession phase. I argue that a more sustainable shift in the 
domestic power balance would require both the EU and domestic civil society actors to place 
more emphasis on fostering improved practices of civil society inclusion in domestic policy-
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The EU accession process brings a profound transformation not only to candidate countries’ 
institutions and policies, but also to the political opportunity structure in place. The shift from 
a self-contained state to a multi-level governance system with a dominant EU component 
inevitably has a strong impact on interactions at the domestic level. Previously marginalised 
actors may find their claims bolstered as their preferences overlap with the demands 
emanating from the EU. At the same time, conditionality and political pressure for reform 
impose strong constraints on formerly largely unchecked executives. This change in the 
domestic power balance opens the possibility for a broader spectrum of actors to become 
involved in domestic policy-making. The EU’s call for participatory democracy and its 
growing financial and political support for civil society inclusion furthers such a dynamic. 
Yet, as this paper will argue, it is precisely the need for and reliance upon EU leverage as a 
vehicle for civil society empowerment that makes the long-term prospect of strengthening 
civil society actors doubtful. 
 
Europeanisation scholars have coined the term ‘differential empowerment’ to describe 
alterations in the domestic power balance induced by the European integration process 
(Cowles et al. 2001; Börzel and Risse 2003). The accession process and its inherent 
asymmetry between the EU and the candidate state (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003) appears 
as a particularly favourable context for previously marginalised actors to improve their 
position on the domestic scene. Yet, previous research in Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEE) yielded mixed results: while some authors found a limited degree of 
empowerment in the presence of enabling transnational actors (Parau 2009; Langbein 2010), 
others have suggested that civil society actors in accession countries are too weak to 
effectively capitalize on new opportunities and thus function essentially as agents of an EU 
agenda (Sudbery 2010; Börzel and Buzogany 2010). This situation is accentuated by the 
overdependence of non-governmental organisations (NGOs)1 on external donors that 
transforms local organisations into political service providers and estranges them from their 
original constituencies (Ker-Lindsay 2013; Beichelt et al. 2014). The present paper focuses on 
pre- and post-accession dynamics in Croatia as the most recent EU member state, studying 
how the shifting political opportunity structure influenced NGOs’ strategies and targets, and 
to what extent they were able to use the accession process as a means for empowerment. 
 
This paper shows that while a limited form differential empowerment of NGOs did occur 
during the accession process, it amounted to a temporary phenomenon rather than a long-term 
  
result of membership negotiations. This is largely due to a strategy of mirroring EU 
conditionality both in content and in form that found its natural end once the EU withdrew as 
a powerful driver of domestic change. Drawing on extensive fieldwork, I trace the curvilinear 
evolution of NGO mobilisation in the field of rule of law: following late organisation due to a 
lack of awareness for EU-related opportunities, a broad coalition of NGOs had its moment of 
glory towards the close of membership negotiations. However, its relevance quickly faded 
once an accession date was set and EU interest in critical input waned, leading to a strategic 
reorientation towards domestic targets, and eventually to a demobilisation of the movement. 
These findings hold important lessons both on the limits of externally driven civil society 
empowerment and on potential improvements to the EU’s approach to civil society in future 
accession negotiations. 
 
EU accession and changing political opportunity structure 
The EU accession process draws aspiring member states into highly complex and increasingly 
lengthy negotiations centring on the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria, including the full 
adoption and ability to implement the EU’s growing acquis. The deep engagement with the 
EU has a profound impact on the political opportunity structure, drawing domestic actors 
from a simple, often hierarchical political set-up into a ‘two-level game’ (Putnam 1988) with 
the EU as a dominant player (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). Social movement 
scholars have pointed out how the emergence of a multi-level governance system has resulted 
not in a mere displacement of contentious action from the domestic to the European level, but 
instead in a diversification of domestic actors’ mobilisation strategies (Imig and Tarrow 
2000). Moreover, the concept of opportunity structure itself has shifted from a more rigid, 
structural understanding towards the acknowledgement of its dynamically constructed nature 
that allows for a feedback effect from interest group activity upon the structural environment 
in which it takes place (McAdam et al. 2001). The case has been made for a fruitful 
combination of the ‘exogenous’ and ‘endogenous’ approaches to opportunity structures 
(Princen and Kerremans 2008). 
 
The asymmetry between the EU and the candidate state that is inherent to the accession 
process (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003) makes this context particularly relevant for an 
analysis of civil society mobilisation across multiple levels of governance. The ongoing 
membership negotiations would seem to favour civil society empowerment on two counts: 
firstly, in terms of procedure, NGOs are aided by the EU’s increasingly explicit call for 
  
participatory democracy and civil society inclusion in the accession framework (European 
Commission 2001; 2007; 2013a). Aiming to overcome the executive-dominated nature of the 
Central and Eastern European enlargement process (Grabbe 2001; Lippert et al. 2001) and the 
resulting superficial adaptation of membership candidates, the European Commission has 
complemented its financial support and capacity-building efforts to NGOs in enlargement 
countries with a more political approach centred on fostering an ‘enabling environment’ for 
civil society activity and improving state-NGO relations (Wunsch 2015). Secondly, in terms 
of content, EU conditionality forms an important reference point for NGO advocacy 
activities. While a negative reading of this dynamic might view NGOs as mere transmission 
belts for EU demands, the significant degree of natural overlap between the political criteria 
for accession and the human rights and democratisation goals of NGOs may in fact enable 
them to draw on EU conditionality without compromising their own agenda. 
 
The most explicit manifestation of a changed political opportunity structure is certainly the 
emergence of the EU level as a new venue for domestic demands and a potential arbiter 
between conflicting interests (McAdam and Marks 1996). Over the years, the European 
Commission has gradually extended and institutionalised its consultations with NGOs in 
candidate countries, enabling them to feed directly into the EU’s assessments on progress 
made on the ground and to raise issues of concern. Not only is this an opportunity for NGOs 
to shape EU conditionality, but it also offers them a potential ally for their demands. The 
‘Brussels route’ therefore emerges as an alternative to domestic mobilisation (Eising 2007; 
Jelinčić and Đurović 2011), enabling NGOs to by-pass state-level actors and to use EU 
leverage to channel their own demands. This type of indirect strategy has been described as 
‘boomerang pattern’ whereby domestic NGOs seek international allies to bring pressure on 
their states from outside (Keck and Sikkink 1999).  
 
At the domestic level, EU pressure for inclusive policy-making, as well as a more general 
trend towards increased transparency and accountability over the course of democratic 
consolidation, can be thought to open additional possibilities for civil society actors. 
Nonetheless, it is important to separate the formal openness of a political system and the 
receptiveness of policy-makers (Hilson 2002), with the latter a question of political culture 
more than of institutional configurations. Thus, while the accession process may improve 
NGO access at the domestic level, such access can only be a favourable precondition – and by 
no means a guarantee – for more substantial forms of influence (De Bièvre 2008). Besides, 
  
the mere speed of the accession process, more specifically the need to adopt a large number of 
new laws in a short space of time, can preclude the holding of effective consultations 
(Škrabalo 2012). While it is undeniable that the EU accession process brings considerable 
changes to the political opportunity structure in which NGOs in candidate countries operate 
and thus holds the potential for civil society empowerment, the EU accession process does, 
despite its increasingly drawn-own nature, in fine extend over a temporally limited period, 
with the attendant consequences upon the effectiveness of the EU’s leverage and the 
possibility for backsliding post-accession (Dimitrova 2010; Sedelmeier 2012; 2014). 
 
Theoretical framework: EU leverage and domestic agency 
The Europeanisation process offers the possibility for a differential empowerment of actors 
who were previously side-lined, both through changes in their external environment – in the 
form of opportunities and threats – and through resulting shifts in their resources, objectives, 
and behaviour (Fairbrass and Jordan 2002). Yet, to presume that such changes in the domestic 
power balance occur automatically in the presence of specific external conditions would be 
overly simplistic. Instead, Europeanisation scholarship has increasingly focused on the role of 
domestic agency in shaping the concrete outcomes on the ground (Ripoll Servent and Busby 
2013; Elbasani 2013). The three-step ‘usages’ approach (Jacquot and Woll 2004; 2010) is a 
particularly useful device when addressing the domestic intermediation of EU pressures: it 
suggests, firstly, that actors recognize or create political opportunities at the European level; 
secondly, that they consciously use these opportunities to further their political goals or to 
enhance their standing in the national arena; and thirdly, that these usages may translate into a 
concrete impact of actors upon a certain outcome. Opportunities therefore become only a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for political usage, which in turn is necessary yet not 
sufficient in order to achieve actual influence (Jacquot and Woll 2003). Rather than 
establishing a direct link between EU pressures and domestic change, the ‘usages’ approach 
posits actors’ strategic behaviour as an intermediary step between opportunities and their 
eventual outcomes. The focus lies on agency and on tracing whether, when, and how domestic 
actors have drawn on the EU for their own strategies within the domestic policy-making 
dynamics (Graziano et al. 2011).  
 
How does this agency-centred understanding of the possible impact of a changed political 
opportunity structure translate into concrete expectations regarding the behaviour and 
performance of NGOs throughout and beyond the EU accession process? Most crucially, it 
  
shifts our focus from an analysis of the impact of EU support to a study of actor mobilisation 
and changing advocacy strategies and targets. Interest group scholars have argued that the 
emergence of a multi-level governance structure imposes a ‘dual strategy’ on organised 
interests, whereby it becomes mandatory to combine multiple channels of access to be present 
in the policy process at all stages (Kohler-Koch 1997). Subsequent research has investigated 
which factors would determine, in the face of limited resources, whether interest groups 
would mobilize at the EU or the national level (Eising 2007; Beyers and Kerremans 2007; 
Dür and Matteo 2012). It seems obvious that NGOs in candidate countries do not have the 
possibility of maintaining deep engagement with all actor levels all the time. Instead, it is 
more realistic to expect a concentration of activities on the level considered most immediately 
relevant to NGOs’ concerns, and most likely to respond favourably. Which this level is, is 
likely to vary over time depending on the status of a country within the accession process. 
 
During the pre-accession phase, I expect a strong resort to EU-level mobilisation and a 
concurrent strengthening of NGO claims especially in areas where they overlap with 
membership conditionality. In contrast, the cessation of EU conditionality deprives NGOs of 
a crucial tool, with extensive evidence that domestic reforms are largely driven by EU 
membership requirements (Kelley 2004; Grabbe 2006; Börzel 2010a). I suppose that this loss 
of both active and passive EU leverage (Vachudova 2006) translates into a reorientation of 
advocacy activities towards the domestic level, and a relative decline in any civil society 
empowerment that may have taken place in the pre-accession phase. The two guiding 
hypotheses for my empirical analysis are therefore as follows: 
H1: The pre-accession phase sees NGO empowerment through the strategic usage of EU 
leverage. 
H2: The post-accession phase sees a reorientation of NGO strategies to the domestic level 
and a decline in their relative strength. 
 
Besides analysing at which level – EU or national – actors mobilize it is useful to think about 
opportunities also in terms of what they are for (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). In line with the 
three-step model of usages, one may distinguish between opportunities for mobilisation 
(usages), and those for policy change (impact) (Meyer 2004a). Civil society empowerment 
has typically been defined as a shift in the relative strength of NGOs vis-à-vis executive actors 
(Parau 2009) that implies the ability to foster some form of domestic change (Sudbery 2010). 
However, precisely in light of the limited findings of civil society empowerment in existing 
  
empirical studies, it is useful to expand the definition of empowerment beyond substantial 
influence to comprise also more procedural forms of impact (Kitschelt 1986). This may take 
the form of a recognition of NGOs as relevant policy actors, even where their demands are not 
reflected in the final policy outcomes (Betsill and Correll 2001), or of a general consolidation 
of a previously disparate movement (O’Dwyer 2012). Since recent findings from the Western 
Balkans suggest that constructive exchanges between state and civil society actors are 
hampered both by a lack of capacities and a lack of willingness on both sides to engage 
constructively (Börzel and Buzogany 2010), it is likely that civil society empowerment will 
be at best procedural, and closely related to EU leverage.  
 
The assumption of a pivotal role for EU pressures in triggering differential empowerment is in 
line with traditional approaches to accession Europeanisation (Börzel and Risse 2003; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). However, the emphasis upon domestic actors’ 
strategic usage of this enabling function of conditionality to enlarge their repertoire (Tilly 
1983; McAdam et al. 2001; 2009) brings a new perspective to the study of domestic 
interactions throughout the EU accession process. Whereas existing research mainly focuses 
on dyadic relationships between the EU and a specific subset of domestic actors1, the present 
study sheds light on the triangular dynamics connecting the EU, the state, and the NGO 
levels. Moreover, the temporal extension of the study beyond the accession date allows for an 
assessment of the sustainability of differential empowerment induced through overlapping 
preferences and examines the capacity of NGOs to adjust their strategies to a renewed shift in 
the political opportunity structure. 
 
Research design and methods 
The research design centres on a within-case analysis of a movement trajectory, heeding the 
call for a more process-oriented understanding of political opportunities that disaggregates not 
only outcomes, but also actors involved in producing them (Meyer 2004a). By tracing the 
evolution of NGOs’ advocacy strategies and targets over time, I seek to uncover the impact of 
the shifting political opportunity structure triggered by the changing status regarding EU 
membership and the resulting shift in the EU’s leverage. This actor-centred approach 
complements the more structure-oriented studies that seek to evaluate the impact of the EU’s 
civil society support upon local actors (Fagan 2006; 2009) and offers a more complex insight 
                                                 
1
 Cf. Grabbe 2001 and Lippert et al. 2001 for the EU’s impact on executives, Fagan 2009 and Börzel 2010 for 
NGOs. 
  
into the functioning of EU conditionality as a tool for differential empowerment. Moreover, 
such a longitudinal study allows for the division of a single case into two distinct ‘before’ and 
‘after’ cases amenable to comparative study through process-tracing (George and Bennett 
2005: 79-83).  
 
The choice of Croatia explains itself through the country’s intermediary status as a ‘bridge’ 
between the CEE enlargements of 2004 and 2007 and the pending membership applications of 
the remaining Western Balkan countries. While Croatia failed, largely due to its stalled 
democratisation throughout the 1990s, to ‘upgrade’ to CEE status in the way its neighbour 
Slovenia managed to, it did succeed to negotiate its accession rather swiftly following the 
opening of talks in October 2005, with negotiations closed less than six years later, in June 
2011, and the accession treaty signed in December of the same year. The negotiations 
themselves were marked by a shift in the EU’s attention from legal adaptation to actual 
implementation of adopted changes on the ground, in an attempt to foster deeper changes that 
would be less easily reversed post-accession. This focus on implementation, coupled with a 
reinforcement of the EU’s support to NGOs with the launch of a Civil Society Facility from 
2008 (European Commission 2007), seems to offer more favourable conditions for civil 
society empowerment than was the case in CEE, making Croatia a particularly interesting 
instance for study. The chosen time period for analysis is 2010 to 2014, which comprises the 
late stages of the accession process, the interval from the closure of membership talks to 
actual entry into the EU, and the first year of Croatia’s experience as a member state 
following its entry on 1 July 2013.  
 
An examination of NGO mobilisation in the broader sector of rule of law, rather than around a 
specific issue, allows for a more global appreciation of the dynamics at play. The concrete 
analysis thus focuses on NGOs working in the area of acquis chapter 23, which deals with 
judiciary and human rights. The high concentration of NGOs active in the field of rule of law 
facilitates the extensive collection of data, which is crucial for effective process-tracing 
(Schimmelfennig 2006; Checkel 2013). Given the centrality of rule of law to the overall 
domestic reform process and the ensuing high level of EU attention and thus of EU leverage, 
it becomes a most-likely case for civil society empowerment. Such a choice makes sense in 
light of previous findings of limited civil society empowerment in CEE (Börzel 2010b), as it 
increases the chances of positive findings. Yet, it concurrently reduces the potential of 
generalisability, which is an important limitation of this research design.  
  
The empirical analysis builds on data gathered in 40 semi-structured face-to-face interviews, 
eight of which were conducted in Brussels on several shorter trips over the period from 
November 2013 to March 2014, and 32 during a six-week fieldwork stay in Croatia between 
March and May 2014. Interviewees were selected by snowball sampling (Morgan 2008) and 
drawn from NGOs, state institutions, as well as the EU and other international donor 
institutions. They were asked to recount, from their respective perspective, NGO mobilisation 
around chapter 23 both in terms of their scope of activity and their degree of engagement with 
different sets of domestic and EU-level actors from the opening of chapter 23 up to the point 
at which the interview took place. Interviews were conducted in Croatian or in English. In 
order to obtain as comprehensive an insight as possible and avoid reliance upon a single 
source for specific facts, interviews were frequently held with several different representatives 
from the same organisation or institution. In addition, documentary analysis of EU 
documents, NGO publications and press releases, as well as media reports from Croatia was 
used to triangulate the information obtained from actors themselves and in order to fill 
evidentiary gaps necessary for the close tracing of evolving NGO strategies.  
 
Empirical findings 
The empirical findings suggest three distinct periods of NGO mobilisation: firstly, following 
late awareness for the opportunities related to the EU accession process, a small number of 
prominent NGO members managed to gather a broad coalition of organisations that devised a 
rather effective strategy of shadow reports complementing the EU’s periodic assessments to 
draw attention to outstanding issues prior to the closure of chapter 23. Following the closure 
of accession talks, EU interest in critical civil society input waned, and the monitoring 
coalition reconstituted itself as a formal Platform formulating a series of demands to domestic 
policy-makers. Finally, the last months of the accession process saw a turn towards public 
campaigns aimed against the rising conservative backlash in certain areas of human rights, 
with post-accession financial difficulties and time constraints leading to a steady decline of 
the movement. The findings seem to illustrate the crucial role of EU leverage as an enabling 
factor for civil society empowerment, while suggesting at the same time that this 
empowerment is often procedural rather than substantial in nature. 
 
Late, but successful mobilisation 
Croatian civil society mobilised rather late in the accession process, with the initial stages of 
the negotiations marked by bilateral contacts between the European Commission representing 
  
the member states and Croatia as a candidate country. NGOs during this period displayed a 
general disinterest in EU-related matters, focusing instead on domestic issues and adapting 
only very gradually to the new multi-level environment that had come to determine the speed 
and orientation of the domestic reform process. As one Croatian NGO representative put it in 
a written contribution for the newsletter of a Serbian organisation: 
It is not that we did not want to be involved: it is that in 2007, when the negotiations 
started to gain momentum, we certainly did not know as much about public advocacy as 
we do today. The doors of the Government of Croatia and the EU Delegation remained 
shut to us for a long time. (Teršelič 2014: 7) 
Still, during the initial years of Croatia’s membership negotiations, a progressive structural 
change in the country’s NGO landscape became noticeable: increased access to EU funding 
for project-based activities geared a number of organisations towards dealing with accession-
related topics, resulting frequently in the creation of EU-oriented programmes within NGOs 
and an administrative restructuring to respond to the complexity of the fundraising process 
(Đokic/Sumpor 2013). Moreover, an increasing number of NGOs began to move from 
advocacy-focused activities to monitoring and the regular publication of very detailed reports 
on specific areas mostly related to the rule of law and the protection of human rights.2 The 
structural adaptation of the NGO scene to the accession process also transpired through the 
use of more managerial approaches to advocacy work, with a growing number of 
organisations undergoing regular strategic planning sessions and working with policy 
frameworks and other formal guidelines borrowed from the international development 
toolkit.3 This professionalisation, though it did not result in an immediate inclusion of NGOs 
in the ongoing negotiations, set the stage for their more substantial involvement at later stages 
of the process. 
 
A further substantial step in this direction consisted in the progressive recognition of NGOs as 
sources of information by the EU Delegation on the ground. Starting from 2008 as an 
expression of the Commission’s commitment to civil society support articulated in the 
enlargement strategy a few months earlier, the Delegation staff in charge of the monitoring of 
reforms and the drafting of the annual progress report began to consult NGOs on their views 
                                                 
2
 Interviews with representatives of the Youth Initiative for Human Rights, 8 May 2014, and of Documenta, 26 
May 2014. 
3
 Interview with a representative of GONG, 6 May 2014. 
  
of their government’s performance regarding a variety of commitments.4 This offered a 
valuable access point for NGOs to feed into the EU assessments of their country’s 
performance, opening a new venue for their demands. Confirming the importance of 
transnational actors found in earlier studies (Parau 2009; Langbein 2010), it was the Open 
Society Foundation’s Brussels Office that advocated for an institutionalisation of civil society 
consultations both through the Delegations and at DG Enlargement itself, contributing 
funding to cover the travel expenses of NGO representatives presenting their views in 
Brussels.5 
 
On the whole, Croatian NGOs’ involvement in the early stages of the accession process was 
characterized by a certain apathy mainly due to a lack of awareness for potential new 
opportunities and a lack of appreciation for the actual speed of the ongoing negotiations. Their 
gradual awakening to the reality of the accession process was mainly triggered through a 
demand for information from the EU Delegation’s side and through an increased involvement 
with EU bodies due to the availability of project funding that resulted in both a structural and 
a thematic adaptation of the Croatian NGO scene to the requirements of the ongoing 
negotiations. This finding of very limited early usages EU-related opportunities by NGOs, 
which was essentially limited to the use of financial resources and demand-driven input into 
the Delegation’s consultation process, points to the simplistic nature of a purely structural 
take on political opportunity structures. As long as opportunities are not recognized (see 
Meyer 2004b; Amenta and Halfmann 2012 on ‘missed opportunities’), they cannot be used, 
and therefore do not impact actors’ strategic behaviour. 
 
Broad and visible mobilisation of Croatian NGOs did not occur until the opening of 
negotiations in acquis chapter 23. While NGO involvement in all chapters was originally 
foreseen in the Croatian negotiation structure, and did occur in other fields6, no NGO 
representatives were formally associated in the talks on chapter 23. The closed nature of the 
domestic political opportunity structure therefore left extra-institutional mobilisation and the 
near-exclusive use of the ‘Brussels route’ as the obvious alternatives. Sensing the urgency to 
act before the closure of accession negotiations froze a state of reform with which most NGOs 
were not satisfied, a growing number of human rights and watchdog organisations came 
                                                 
4
 Interviews with a representative of the Open Society Foundation, 3 April 2014, and an EU official, 7 May 
2014. 
5
 Interview with a representative of the Open Society Foundation, 28 March 2014. 
6
 Interview with a representative of Green Action, 12 May 2014. 
  
together as a “coalition for the monitoring of accession negotiations.”7 Most coalition 
members had already been engaged in monitoring activities and were in close communication 
with EU-level actors, making the creation of a joint initiative more of a change in form than in 
methods. Still, bringing together the voices of civil society was crucial in facilitating the 
Commission’s dealings with NGOs8 and in aiding them to become recognized by the 
government as credible actors in the accession process.9  
 
In February 2011, the coalition issued a first joint opinion on Croatia’s readiness to finalize 
negotiations, voicing concern that the “closing of Chapter 23 should mean that positive 
changes in the rule of law are irreversible, which is still not the case” (Joint Opinion of 
Croatian civil society organisations, 2011a). By coincidence, details from the report reached 
the members of the EU negotiating team as they sat in the office of the Croatian Chief 
negotiator, triggering a series of worried questions that took the Croatian side by surprise.10 
Acknowledging the impact of the report on the Commission’s stance towards Croatia, an 
interviewee close to the accession negotiations claimed that its publication was “very 
damaging for us, we had to invest much effort to show we were ready.”11 Three months later, 
the coalition issued a follow-up report that expressed ongoing concerns with reform efforts in 
chapter 23 and the government’s implementation capacities (Joint Opinion of Croatian civil 
society organisations, 2011b). Nonetheless, aware of the risk of postponing the closure of 
negotiations, the coalition conceded that the European Commission may decide to close the 
chapter for political reasons, but called for the establishment of “a formal independent 
monitoring mechanism in at least the first three years upon the closing of negotiations, 
throughout the ratification period and beyond” (ibid: 2).  
 
As expected, the ‘Brussels route’ emerged as the dominant route to civil society 
empowerment in the late stages of the accession process, where EU leverage was at its 
maximum. Once an awareness for the new opportunities had been created – largely by actors 
external to the domestic NGO scene – there was a sudden surge both in the level of NGO 
activity and in their degree of recognition by EU-level actors. The coalition in particular 
enjoyed a resounding success, which one if its members summarized as “everyone wanted to 
                                                 
7
 Interviews with representative of Documenta, 5 May 2014, Green Action, 12 May 2014, and the Centre for 
Peace Studies, 13 May 2014. 
8
 Interview with a representative of the Open Society Foundation, 3 April 2014. 
9
 Interview with a representative of the Croatian Foreign Office, 4 April 2014. 
10
 Interview with a member of the Croatian negotiating team, 4 April 2014. 
11
 Interview with a former government representative, 1 April 2014. 
  
meet us (…) the coalition became the strongest NGO player on the scene”12. Encouraged by 
the local office of the Heinrich Böll Foundation and an EU official to go beyond local 
contacts in the EU Delegation, the coalition used its monitoring reports to engage with a 
broad range of EU-level actors, including Commission officials in Brussels, representatives of 
member state Embassies and MEPs, particularly from the Green Party.13 The awareness on 
the side of governments actors of these close contacts, as well as the occasional mentioning of 
NGO comments by EU officials in their dealings with state-level actors increased credibility 
of NGOs on the domestic scene.14 
 
On the whole, it appears that the differential empowerment of Croatian NGOs was enabled by 
the concurrent appearance of a number of conditions: firstly, the closure of accession 
negotiations opened a window of opportunity where EU leverage was at its maximum. Even 
more specifically, the coalition members were able to benefit from the EU’s near-exclusive 
focus on chapter 23, which was among the very last, and the most sensitive, to be closed. 
Their priorities were therefore aligned with those of the EU, greatly facilitating the emergence 
of a ‘boomerang pattern’ of empowerment. Secondly, transnational actors supported NGO 
efforts by pointing out concrete opportunities for NGO mobilisation and pushing for increased 
engagement of the EU with civil society actors. Such a more comprehensive advocacy 
strategy increased the range of international allies supporting NGO claims, in turn 
strengthening their credibility vis-à-vis government actors. Finally, the chosen methodology 
of shadow reports was most likely to raise the EU’s attention. Indeed, comments from EU 
officials suggest that the monitoring reports were so successful precisely because they 
mimicked the EU’s technocratic language, offering critical input in a format easily digestible 
for the target group.15 
 
Despite the obvious achievements of the coalition, the rise of the monitoring coalition is also 
indicative of the extent to which civil society empowerment is tied to the proactive usage of 
EU leverage, and thus likely to be limited in time. Most importantly, and foreshadowing the 
developments to come, civil society empowerment remained largely procedural: whereas 
NGOs did manage to raise the Commission’s awareness for certain specific shortcomings 
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 Interview with a representative of B.a.B.e., 31 March 2014. 
13
 Interviews with representatives of the Heinrich Böll Foundation, 7 May 2014, and of GONG, 2 April 2014, the 
Centre for Peace Studies, 31 March and 13 May 2014, and Green Action, 12 May 2014.  
14
 Interview with a former member of the negotiation team, 1 April 2014 and a former member of the negotiation 
Secretariat, 4 November 2014. 
15
 Interview with an EU official, 14 March 2014. 
  
overlooked in its earlier assessments2, there is no clear evidence for a substantial impact of 
NGOs on either the timing or the conditions of the closure of membership talks. Tellingly, the 
coalition’s central demand – the establishment of a post-accession internal monitoring 
mechanism to prevent the backsliding of reforms – was rejected. Whereas EU actors were 
initially interested in such a mechanism, they eventually backed off in the face of the Croatian 
government’s reluctance16, all the more since both the Commission and the member states 
were wary that such a decision might be interpreted as signalling a failure on the part of 
Croatia to fully meet all membership requirements prior to entering the EU.17  
 
Reorientation to the domestic level 
The closure of accession negotiations, much more so than Croatia’s actual accession two 
years later, inaugurated a crucial shift in the political opportunity structure domestic NGOs 
were faced with. In the words of one interviewee, the Commission began to “behave like a 
bad stepmother”18, turning its back on the very organisations it had previously contributed to 
strengthening and used as a major source of information when drafting its assessments on 
Croatia’s progress. With the change in Croatia’s membership status imminent, both the EU 
and the member states were keen to treat their political counterparts as equals, avoiding all-
too-harsh criticism of outstanding shortcomings. Thus, while the Commission continued to 
publish semi-annual monitoring reports on Croatia’s readiness until three months before its 
entry (European Commission 2013b), these were more of a formal exercise, and at no point 
was the previously fixed accession date called into question. Incentive for further reform was 
thus minimal, as was the EU leverage NGO empowerment had so crucially depended on. 
 
In light of the new situation, Croatian NGOs adapted their mobilisation strategies, shifting 
their advocacy from the EU to the domestic level. Shortly before the next legislative elections, 
held in December 2011 six months after accession negotiations with Croatia had officially 
been concluded, the coalition formulated 112 distinct requests to all political parties running 
for office. Renamed ‘Platform 112’, the coalition meanwhile united 70 different 
organisations. It succeeded in having all parties indicate which requests they would be 
prepared to comply with should they become part of the government19 and, in April 2012 and 
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 Interview with a representative of B.a.B.e., 31 March 2014. 
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 Interviews with a Croatian academic, 12 May 2014, a member state representative, 12 May 2014, and an EU 
official, 1 April 2014. 
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 Interview with a representative of the Youth Initiative for Human Rights, 6 May 2014. 
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 Interview with a representative of the Centre for Peace Studies, 31 March 2014. 
  
in March 2013, published comprehensive reports on the government’s performance on all 112 
requests. However, despite public recognition and wide media coverage across the country, 
the Platform suffered from the notable change in attitude of its former EU-level allies.20 While 
the Platform and its individual members continued to refer to the commitments taken on by 
Croatia during the accession process in their monitoring reports, they could no longer rely on 
the backing of the EU, which significantly weakened their demands.21 Following the closure 
of accession negotiations, the only recently established triangle of EU-state-NGO actors was 
thus once again reduced to a dyad, with bilateral relations between EU actors and the soon-to-
be new member state dominating the scene, and NGOs left on the margins of accession-
related interactions.  
 
The overreliance of NGOs on the ‘Brussels route’ throughout the accession process is not 
without consequence upon their potential for empowerment once EU leverage seeps away. 
Indeed, the near-exclusive focus on engagement with EU-level actors leads to a neglect of the 
domestic dimension, not just in terms of substantial advocacy efforts – here, the EU indeed 
was the more likely ally and the ‘Brussels route’ thus the more rational, effective choice – but 
also when it comes to fostering domestic forms of access that could have been carried over 
into the post-accession phase. Whereas a number of changes did take place, partly in response 
to EU pressure for inclusive policy-making, partly thanks to civil servants with an NGO 
background pushing for improvements of national-level consultation processes22, NGOs 
themselves were less involved in seeking to transform the domestic political opportunity 
structure. While the endogenous dimension of the political opportunity structure thus is 
highlighted by the late mobilisation of NGOs, suggesting that opportunities exist only where 
they are recognized as such, subsequent mobilisation patterns indicate that NGOs largely took 
the political opportunity structure as a given at NGOs took in their strategic calculations 
(Kriesi 1995). The privileging of the ‘Brussels route’ thus became the ‘path of least 
resistance’ in the face of tense state-NGO relations on the ground, but simultaneously 
precluded a more long-term empowerment of civil society actors. 
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 Interviews with a representative of GONG, 2 April 2014, of Zagreb Pride, 6 May 2014, and with two member 
state representatives, 12 and 14 May 2014. 
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 Interview with a representative of Documenta, 5 May 2014, and of GONG, 6 May 2014. 
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 Interviews with a representative of the Government Office for NGOs, 4 April 2014, and a government official, 
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The temporal limitation of civil society empowerment was compounded by two factors: 
during the accession talks, speed was of utmost priority for the Croatian negotiating team. The 
overall process was driven by a desire on the side of state actors to complete negotiations as 
fast as possible, resulting in a certain hostility towards critical NGO remarks on incomplete 
reforms.23 An analysis of the policy-making process in Croatia claims that ‘the “hurry-up 
atmosphere” created around legislative initiatives (…) significantly narrowed down the space 
for meaningful participation of non-state actors in the process of policy formulation’ (Vidacak 
2011: 7). Following the closure of accession talks, it is the lack of an ongoing monitoring 
mechanism that prevents NGOs from drawing on any ongoing EU leverage over domestic 
reforms. Recent findings from Bulgaria and Romania suggest that it is precisely the 
introduction of a co-operation and verification mechanism for these two countries that enables 
non-state actors to use EU rules to promote better governance even post-accession (Dimitrova 
and Buzogany 2014). The decision against a similar, even internal, monitoring mechanism for 
Croatia deprived the local NGOs of a crucial tool for their ongoing empowerment. 
 
Another consequence of the rapidity of change during the final stages of accession process is 
the conservative backlash that has characterized Croatian society post-accession (Dolenec 
2015), and that stands in contradiction to the liberal democratic agendas NGOs sought to 
promote throughout the membership progress. It is against this rise of intolerance that 
Platform 112 has mobilized in its most recent shift from state-level targets to citizens.24 The 
Platform launched two major campaigns, one seeking to convince voters in a national 
referendum to reject the introduction of a constitutional ban on same-sex marriages, and 
another regarding the protection of the use of Cyrillic script in areas with a large Serbian 
minority. Drawing on established media contacts and targeting a wide audience through 
public events and press conferences, the Platform is seeking to position itself as a promoter of 
tolerance of and liberal norms in line with ‘European values’ the country was thought to 
embrace by becoming an EU member.25 While their arguments failed to convince a majority 
of voters in the same-sex referendum campaign – the constitutional amendment defining 
marriage as a union of man and woman was adopted with 64.8% of the votes – it seems that 
the substantial analysis of Croatia’s commitments under the accession process and various 
international conventions regarding the protection of minority languages (YIHR 2014)3 
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played no minor role in leading the Constitutional Court to strike down the referendum on a 
restriction of the use of Cyrillic (Balkan Insight 2014). 
 
Despite the Platform’s ongoing activities, it is struggling to find its place post-accession.26 
Besides the loss of the EU as its most powerful ally, an increasing number of organisations 
are also suffering from the gradual withdrawal of international donors and the complicated 
transition from pre-accession to structural funds that frequently results in payment gaps that 
put at risk the very survival of some of the strongest NGOs.27 The latest Platform report 
published in November 2014, almost two years after the previous one, is revelatory of the 
decline of the movement. Continuing the downward trend in terms of length – the first report 
was 30 pages, the second seven, the latest only two – it self-describes as an “abstract” and 
“cursory assessment” (Platform 112 2014). The tone is bitter, with the state of play assessed 
as a “long-term downward trajectory into the abyss” (ibid.:  1) where “the role of citizens and 
organised civil society is still being ignored, especially when politically sensitive issues are at 
stake.” Departing from previous practice, and expressing the degree of disillusionment with 
the performance of government actors, the report also makes no recommendations for 
improving the work of authorities, “since we believe it to be unrealistic to expect substantial 
reforms in the forthcoming election year” (ibid.: 1). 
 
In sum, it thus appears that civil society empowerment in Croatia has come full circle: 
following late, but successful mobilisation through the strategic usage of EU leverage in the 
final stages of the accession process, the waning of the EU’s interest forced NGOs to focus 
their attention on engagement with domestic actors. However, the post-accession political 
opportunity structure proved much less receptive to their claims: attempts to pressure the new 
government into completing outstanding reforms even once membership talks had been 
concluded largely failed, and attempts to re-engage with citizens were at least mitigated given 
the rise of social conservatism following Croatia’s entry into the EU. Moreover, even where 
civil society empowerment did occur, it was largely procedural, allowing NGOs to mobilize 
and gain strength through the use of EU leverage, but limiting their potential to wield 
substantial influence to areas where their preferences were closely aligned with those of the 
EU. 
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Discussion 
The close study of the evolution of NGO mobilisation in the field of law throughout the 
Croatian accession process shows that differential empowerment of civil society actors is at 
best a temporary phenomenon and not a long-term consequence of the EU accession process. 
This is largely due to the crucial role EU leverage plays in empowering domestic actors, and 
which closely circumscribes both the substantial and temporal realm in which they can hope 
to gain strength vis-à-vis other players. Once a country has passed a certain threshold in the 
accession process – the closure of formal negotiations seems to play a more important role 
here than the actual accession – the EU’s interest in critical NGO input dwindles and the 
window of opportunity for NGO empowerment closes. In the absence of a favourable 
domestic political opportunity structure, the strengthening of NGOs on the national scene 
quickly halted or even reversed.  
 
At the same time, the findings point to the importance of agency in transforming opportunities 
into actual impact, be it only at the procedural level. Only once NGOs became aware of ways 
in which they could use the change in the political opportunity structure to their advantage did 
the emergence of a multi-level set-up actually influence their strategic behaviour and 
therefore the domestic power balance. Effective and comprehensive mobilisation towards EU-
level actors became a means to bypass more reluctant state-level actors and exert indirect 
pressure upon the government via EU conditionality and the membership incentive. The 
fostering of such awareness through international donors and EU officials confirms the 
powerful influence of transnational actors on democratic transition processes (Orenstein et al. 
2008). Still, support by transnational actors alone is insufficient to trigger civil society 
empowerment in the longer term, given that inclusive procedures at the domestic level are still 
in their very early stages (Vidacak 2011). 
 
The Croatian experience holds a number of lessons for ongoing negotiations with accession 
candidates. First of all, if the EU wants to contribute to a more lasting empowerment of civil 
society in accession countries, it needs to place emphasis the transformation of the domestic 
political opportunity structure, including the political culture that shapes state-civil society 
relations. As long as civil society empowerment passes almost exclusively through 
engagement with EU-level actors, it will remain constrained to the duration of the accession 
process and quickly unravel once EU pressure subsides. While the introduction of a post-
accession monitoring mechanism, be it through the EU or internally with a degree of EU 
  
oversight, can extend the enabling function of EU leverage beyond the accession date, it 
would still be only a transitional solution towards a deeper transformation of local 
consultation practices. Given that it requires time for institutional changes to translate into 
new practices, it would be useful for any improvements in domestic-level engagement with 
civil society actors to take place early on in the accession process for their effects to take hold 
while EU leverage is still strong. A more explicit conditionality on inclusive policy-making, 
as it already seems to be emerging albeit in non-binding terms (European Commission 
2013a), can be a first step towards fostering sustainable civil society empowerment 
throughout – and beyond – the accession process. 
 
Yet, the most fundamental role lies with domestic actors themselves. The late mobilisation of 
Croatian NGOs amputated them of a crucial period during which they could have pushed for 
more fundamental changes in domestic policy-making procedures, rather than acting in a 
context of urgency that precluded more long-term strategic considerations. Late awareness for 
the new opportunities opened by the ongoing accession process made a ‘boomerang’ strategy 
the only hope to affect domestic reforms in the final stretches of the negotiations, resulting in 
the described limited form of empowerment. An earlier mobilisation targeted both at EU-level 
and national actors in an effort to foster a more durable shift in the political opportunity 
structure may have enabled NGOs to create an institutional framework and attitudinal change 
that carried them beyond the accession date, establishing them as policy partners in a spirit of 
participatory democracy. However, such a more long-term approach would have required a 
degree of awareness and strategic capacity that the Croatian NGO scene was not able to 
muster at the time. 
 
Conclusion 
The Croatian experience demonstrates that differential empowerment is a result of the 
combined effects of a changed political opportunity structure and domestic actors able to act 
upon it. EU leverage plays a crucial enabling role especially in the final phases of the 
accession negotiations, where the prospect of EU membership is most immediate and 
executive actors thus most receptive to pressures resulting from EU conditionality and 
domestic criticism. Albeit only during a limited period of time, Croatian NGOs were able to 
capitalize on the altered political opportunity structure by feeding their positions into the 
formulation of the EU’s conditionality and practising a sandwich strategy that mirrored the 
EU’s top-down pressure through bottom-up mobilisation. However, the Croatian case also 
  
suggests that once EU pressure subsides, any NGO involvement that has not been thoroughly 
institutionalized prior to membership is quickly marginalised, with executive policy-making 
taking over once again. In order to correctly capture the dynamics of differential 
empowerment, this process must be studied over time and most crucially in the periods 
leading up to accession and immediately after this crucial shift of a country’s status vis-à-vis 
the EU has taken place. 
 
In light of the ambiguous experience of Croatia, the ongoing enlargement negotiations in 
Montenegro and Serbia represent important opportunities to translate lessons learned into 
improved practices on the ground. A significant degree of exchange is already taking place 
between the three countries, both at the state and the NGO level. The EU has adjusted its 
approach by opening chapter 23 early on in the negotiations to ensure a substantial period of 
time for reforms and their consistent implementation on the ground, thereby enhancing the 
window of opportunity during which NGOs active in this field can draw on EU leverage. At 
the same time, the experience of their Croatian counterparts has made Serbian and 
Montenegrin NGOs are aware of the need to mobilise early and to use the accession process 
to foster more durable forms of inclusion at the domestic level. A close study of the forms and 
reception of this mobilisation can tell whether NGOs in these two countries will be able to 
emancipate themselves from the need for EU leverage and empower themselves more durably 
as credible and effective partners in the domestic policy-making process. 
 
Notes 
                                                 
1
 The term ‘civil society’ tends to comprise a broad scope of non-state actors, ranging from citizens’ groups to 
business associations, trade unions, and non-governmental organisations. This paper focuses only on the latter, 
who are most active in the field of rule of law. 
2
 For instance, oversight over anti-discrimination complaints was given to the Ombudsman rather than a new 
specific Commissioner being created, as the government had originally intended. 
3
 While the Youth Initiative for Human Rights is not a formal member of Platform 112, it closely cooperated 
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